The Iran war once again raises the question of great powers' accountability

More than 100 students were killed, and many others were injured. While the parties continue to debate the military target and specific circumstances, the incident went far beyond a typical "war accident." It forces us to confront a core question of the modern international order: do the legal principles established after World War II still hold binding power over the most powerful actors?

The post-1945 international order was designed with a clear ambition: to eliminate war as a legitimate foreign policy instrument. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force in international relations, except in two narrow cases: self-defense against armed attack, or action authorized by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. This is not merely a technical provision, it is the moral foundation of the entire system.

The U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran was justified by the need to deter a serious strategic threat. However, under current international law, the right to self-defense is not an infinitely flexible concept. According to international practice and precedent, self-defense requires a real "armed attack" or at least an imminent threat with a clear degree of urgency. Expanding this concept to encompass long-term risks, or unproven strategic predictions, could undermine the very principle of prohibiting the use of force.

Rescue workers and residents search through the rubble in the aftermath of what Iranian officials said was an Israeli-U.S. strike on a girls' elementary school in Minab, Iran, Feb. 28, 2026. Photo by Mehr News Agency via AP

This is not the first time the international community has faced the "prevention" argument. In 2003, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was justified by the threat of weapons of mass destruction and potential links to international terrorism. That argument was based on the view that waiting for an actual attack would be too late in the age of modern weaponry. However, when the accusations were not substantiated, the price paid was not only prolonged instability in Iraq, but also a decline in confidence in collective security mechanisms and the legitimacy of international law.

The 2003 precedent illustrates a crucial point: once the threshold of "self-defense" is lowered, other nations can invoke the same logic. If one power uses force based on a subjective assessment of a future threat, there is nothing to prevent other nations from doing the same. The result is a system where norms are replaced by unilateral interpretation.

In the current case, even if we acknowledge the existence of a serious security concern, the legal question does not disappear. Have the conditions of necessity and proportion been met? Are other peaceful measures still viable? And is the Security Council truly incapable of acting, or simply being ignored?

Parallel to the question of the legality of the use of force is the question of how war is conducted. International humanitarian law, particularly the principles of distinction and proportion, requires that warring parties distinguish between military and civilian objectives, and avoid causing harm to civilians that outweighs military gains. When a school becomes the scene of casualties, the burden of accountability is not only political, but also legal.

Defenders of military action argue that civilian casualties are inevitable in modern warfare, especially when military targets are located near populated areas. But international law doesn't demand perfection; it demands utmost prudence and accountability. If these norms are treated as mere formalities, they lose their ability to bind behavior.

The deeper issue lies not in a single event, however tragic, but in its cumulative impact. Each time a state invokes exceptional circumstances to overstep legal boundaries, the space for unilateral action expands a little further.

In an increasingly multipolar world, the consequences of this erosion could be more severe than at the beginning of the 21st century. As power disperses and trust among great powers erodes, maintaining a common set of rules becomes more difficult but also more necessary than ever. If norms regarding the use of force weaken, other areas of tension may see an increase in "precautionary" logic.

The impact of norm erosion is not evenly distributed. In a rules-based order, small and medium-sized nations typically rely on the principle of legal equality to balance power asymmetry.

But as major powers broaden their interpretation of "preventive self-defense," the security space for smaller nations shrinks significantly. If a nation can attack based on a subjective assessment of a potential threat, then smaller nations - those located near geopolitical hotspots - will be left in a state of perpetual uncertainty.

This is particularly noteworthy in Southeast Asia, where many countries must simultaneously manage relations with major powers and maintain regional stability. For countries like Vietnam, the principles of non-use of force and respect for sovereignty are not abstract concepts; they are fundamental conditions for maintaining independent policy space in an increasingly competitive environment.

The erosion of rules also weakens the negotiating position of smaller countries in multilateral institutions. When core rules are interpreted flexibly by the most powerful parties, the ability to invoke law to protect interests diminishes. In the long term, this could push the international system back to a state where physical power - rather than common norms - determines the majority of outcomes.

The paradox is that even countries strong enough to act unilaterally depend on the stability of the very system they are undermining. Global trade, supply chains, financial markets, and technological cooperation all rely on a certain degree of predictability and trust. An order where rules are treated as flexible according to strategic interests creates an environment of uncertainty, where geopolitical risk becomes a constant factor.

Undeniably, the current collective security system has clear flaws. The veto power in the Security Council often leads to deadlock, and the mechanisms for enforcing international law are limited. But the imperfections of the system do not automatically justify ignoring it; rather, they highlight the need for reform, not the opportunity to circumvent legal limitations through unilateral action.

The tragedy at Minab therefore raises questions, questions not only for the United States, Israel, or Iran, but for the international community. Are nations willing to demand accountability, even if it is politically uncomfortable? Are legal norms consistently upheld, or only when they align with strategic interests?

The ultimate question is not simply whether this military action is legal in the narrow sense of the law. The broader question is whether the world remains committed to the idea that the use of force must be exceptional, tightly controlled, and subject to collective oversight. If the answer increasingly leans toward flexible interpretation and unilateral action, the international order will not collapse immediately. But it will transform into a structure based more on deterrence and the balance of power, rather than rules and consensus.

The deaths of the children in Minab cannot change the course of geopolitics. But the event serves as a reminder that behind every legal debate and every strategic argument lie concrete lives.

If the international order is to maintain its legitimacy, it must demonstrate that rules are not merely the language of power, but a genuine mechanism capable of restraining power, applicable to both the strongest and the weaker nations.

*Colonel Pham Quy was formerly the Head of the Staff Department of the Guard Command, Ministry of Public Security.